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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
EDITH SUZANNE RUIZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43069
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2014-6678
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Edith Suzanne Ruiz pled guilty to four counts of forgery, the district court
sentenced her to a total of fourteen years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
About four months later, the district court received a letter from the Department of
Correction recommending that it relinquish jurisdiction. Without holding a hearing on the
matter, the district court issued an order relinquishing jurisdiction. Ms. Ruiz now appeals
to this Court, contending the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence and relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 23, 2014, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Ms. Ruiz
committed six counts of forgery, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-3601, and
three counts of solicitation, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2001, -3601.
(R., pp.6–13.) According to an affidavit in support of the Criminal Complaint, Ms. Ruiz
created forged checks and would cash them herself or require another individual cash
them for her at various businesses. (R., pp.14–22.)
Ms. Ruiz waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate court bound her over
to district court. (R., pp.59–61.) The State filed an Information. (R., pp.64–71.)
Ms. Ruiz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (Change of Plea Hr’g
Tr.,1 p.9, L.6–p.11, L.14.) In exchange for Ms. Ruiz’s guilty plea to four counts of
forgery, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Change of Plea Hr’g
Tr., p.4, Ls.8–18.) In addition, the State agreed to recommend a ten-year sentence with
three years fixed for each count of forgery, to be served concurrently. (Change of Plea
Hr’g Tr., p.4, Ls.11–16.) The district court accepted Ms. Ruiz’s guilty plea.2 (Change of
Plea Hr’g Tr., p.11, Ls.15–22.)

An Objection to the Record was filed on June 24, 2015, because the transcript of the
change of plea hearing was absent from the appellate record. This transcript was added
to the record on August 20, 2015.
2 The written plea agreement offer in this case does not foreclose Ms. Ruiz’s appeal
because that offer expired and the appellate waiver provision is therefore
unenforceable.
On August 6, 2014, the prosecutor signed an “Offer–Plea Agreement,” which
provided that Ms. Ruiz would waive certain appellate rights by accepting the offer.
(R., p.86.) This offer, however, stated: “OFFER EXPIRES: August 7, 2014, @ 3 pm.”
(R., p.86.) The offer also stated: “This offer is withdrawn if the defendant does not (1)
accept it by the expiration date and (2) plead guilty pursuant to the offer at District
Court Arraignment.” (R., p.86.) Neither of these conditions occurred. First, Ms. Ruiz and
her counsel did not sign and date the offer until September 18, 2014, well after the
1

2

On November 3, 2014, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (R., p.102.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Ruiz to fourteen years, with two years fixed, for each
count of forgery, to be served concurrently. (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.18–23.) The
district court retained jurisdiction (“rider”), ordering that it would relinquish jurisdiction if
Ms. Ruiz was not placed in the Therapeutic Community. (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., p.22,
L.23–p.23, L.3.) On November 4, 2014, the district court entered a Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.106–12.) On November 26, 2015, the district received notice that
Ms. Ruiz was placed in the Therapeutic Community. (R., p.114.)
On March 6, 2015, the district court received a letter from the Department of
Correction and an Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (“APSI”).
(R., p.117.) The Department of Correction recommended the district court relinquish
jurisdiction. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),3 p.125.) Without holding a
hearing of the matter, the district court issued an order relinquishing jurisdiction on
March 6, 2015. (R., pp.117–19.)
On March 20, 2015, Ms. Ruiz filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.123–24.)
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
fourteen years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Ruiz, following her guilty plea to
four counts of forgery?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?

August expiration date. (R., p.86.) Second, Ms. Ruiz did not plead guilty at the
arraignment. (R., p.33.) The arraignment occurred on August 25, 2014, and Ms. Ruiz
pled guilty on September 18, 2014. (R., pp.76, 98.) Due to the expiration of the written
plea offer, Ms. Ruiz did not waive her right to appeal the issues raised herein.
3 Citations to the PSI refer to the 147-page electronic document titled “Supreme Court
No. 43069 Edith Suzanne Ruiz Confidential Exhibits.” This document includes both the
PSI and APSI.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of
Fourteen Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Ruiz, Following Her Guilty Plea To
Four Counts Of Forgery
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Ruiz’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-3604 (maximum of fourteen
years). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Ruiz
“must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
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Here, Ms. Ruiz asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends
that the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment in
light of the mitigating factors, including her abusive childhood, mental health problems,
substance abuse issues, need to support her family, and acceptance of responsibility.
Forty-five-year-old Ms. Ruiz had an extremely troubled childhood, which
undoubtedly contributed to her issues today with substance abuse and mental health.
As a child, Ms. Ruiz was “sexually, physically, verbally, and emotionally” abused by her
father, who was an alcoholic. (PSI, p.15.) For example, Ms. Ruiz’s father pointed a gun
at her when she was eight years old. (PSI, p.37.) “She thought he would kill her many
times.” (PSI, p.37.) Ms. Ruiz reported that the sexual abuse by her father occurred
between the ages of nine and twelve. (PSI, p.15.) Her father abused her mother as well.
(PSI, p.15.) Ms. Ruiz’s mother did not get help, however, and actually covered up the
abuse:
[Ms. Ruiz’s] mom is a nurse. Her mom is the one that took her to the
hospital, when she had broken bones, when she was sexually assaulted,
she was physically assaulted, she had bruises. Mom would tell the
hospital she works at what the stories were, and that’s why these things
never got corrected, and there was never any type of help that was given
to Ms. Ruiz during the times when it probably would have helped during
her formative years.
(Sentencing Hr’g Tr., p.16, Ls.8–16.) At the age of twelve, Ms. Ruiz started running
away from home to get away from her father. (PSI, p.15.) She would stay with friends or
other foster children when she ran away. (PSI, p.15.) Sometimes, Ms. Ruiz would run
away with her mother and they would hide from her father together. (PSI, p.15.)
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When Ms. Ruiz was fourteen years old, she got married as a “ticket out” of her
home. (PSI, p.15.) She never talked to her father again. (PSI, p.15.) She began
smoking marijuana daily. (PSI, p.38.) She tried alcohol for the first time at age fifteen,4
but she only got “tipsy maybe four times” in her life. (PSI, p.38.) She explained that she
could not stand the thought of using alcohol because her father was an abusive
alcoholic. (PSI, p.38.) When she was twenty-three years old, she began experimenting
with cocaine and heroin. (PSI, pp.21–22.) At the age of twenty-three or twenty-six, she
began using methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.15, 21–22.) She used methamphetamine
daily, cocaine twice a week, and heroin once a month, all intravenously. (PSI, pp.21–
22.)
After about ten years of marriage, Ms. Ruiz and her husband divorced due to her
drug addiction. (PSI, p.16.) Ms. Ruiz remarried, but that marriage ended after one year.
(PSI, p.17.) Ms. Ruiz then married again. (PSI, p.17.) Her third husband was verbally
abusive. (PSI, p.17.) In September of 1998, her third husband committed suicide by
shooting himself in front of Ms. Ruiz and her children. (PSI, p.17.) Ms. Ruiz stopped
using heroin and cocaine at age twenty-nine5 and stopped using methamphetamine at
age twenty-six or twenty-nine. (PSI, pp.21–22, 15.)
About four or five years ago, Ms. Ruiz started using methamphetamine again,
first by injecting it and then by ingesting it. (PSI, pp.22, 58.) This relapse was brought on

Elsewhere in the PSI, Ms. Ruiz reported that she began experimenting with alcohol at
age twenty-six and “she despised alcohol because of her father’s use while she was
growing up so she did not drink until she was in her 20’s.” (PSI, p.22.) In general, there
are some discrepancies in the PSI as to the dates of Ms. Ruiz’s substance abuse in her
twenties.

4
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by her diagnosis of lung cancer and subsequent “mental breakdown.” (PSI, p.15.)
Ms. Ruiz used methamphetamine every day for the past three years up until her arrest
for the instant charges. (PSI, pp.22, 58.) In addition, Ms. Ruiz has been abusing
prescription medication for about six years. (PSI, p.22.) She reported that she “abused
Norco, Morphine, Tramadol on a daily basis by taking 10 pills each up to five times per
day.” (PSI, p.22.) Ms. Ruiz stated that she never had any substance abuse education or
treatment in the community. (PSI, p.22.)
Based on the information provided during the presentence investigation,
Ms. Ruiz was diagnosed with multiple substance abuse and mental health issues. The
GAIN-I Referral and Recommendation Summary (“GRRS”) diagnosed her with
amphetamine dependence with physiological symptoms, opioid dependence with
physiological symptoms, and cannabis dependence. (PSI, p.47.) She met the lifetime
criteria for substance dependence. (PSI, p.47.) The GRRS recommended Level 2.1
Dual Diagnosis Capable Intensive Outpatient Treatment. (PSI, p.56.) Along with these
substance abuse issues, Ms. Ruiz reported that she had been diagnosed with Bipolar
Disorder, depression, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. (Aug. R., Page 20 of PSI.) Ms. Ruiz also
reported that she has “nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance, attachment issues like
struggling to trust and feel connected. . . . [H]er substance abuse helped her numb
memories of the trauma and feelings she did not want to relive.” (PSI, p.37.) She scored
in the high range of Internal Mental Distress Scale and the lifetime General Victimization

In 1999, Ms. Ruiz was on a rider for forgery, and she reported that she was clean and
sober for about four or five years after the rider. (PSI, pp.14, 22.) She did not receive
any treatment on this rider. (PSI, p.24.)

5
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Scale. (PSI, pp.34, 49, 54.) The Mental Health Assessment diagnosed Ms. Ruiz with
Major Depressive Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and possibly Bipolar
Disorder. (PSI, pp.42–43.)
Moreover, Ms. Ruiz has poor physical health. (PSI, p.20.) Part of her left lung
was removed after her cancer diagnosis. (PSI, p.20; Aug. R., Page 20 of PSI.) She also
had back surgery for Spinal Stenosis and gastric bypass surgery. (PSI, p.20; Aug.
R., Page 20 of PSI.) She has been diagnosed with congestive heart failure,
hypothyroidism, anemia, diabetes, ulcers, and vitamin B-12 deficiency. (PSI, p.37; Aug.
R., Page 20 of PSI.)
In light of this information, Ms. Ruiz contends that her abusive childhood,
substance abuse, and mental health issues are strong mitigating circumstances in
support of a lesser sentence. A sentencing court must give “proper consideration of the
defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in causing defendant to
commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal
conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Further, Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health condition if it is
a significant factor, and the record must show that the sentencing court adequately
considered this factor when imposing a sentence. I.C. § 19-2523; Delling, 152 Idaho at
132–33. Finally, the Court of Appeals has recognized that a defendant’s “extremely
troubled childhood is a factor that bears consideration at sentencing.” State v. Williams,
135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Here, Ms. Ruiz “experienced a chaotic and
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stressful environment as a child,” and she turned to drugs at a young age to escape the
abuse. (PSI, p.37.) Although Ms. Ruiz’s substance abuse helped “numb” the memories
of her traumatic childhood, it caused many other difficulties in her life. (See PSI, p.37.)
In addition, Ms. Ruiz has experienced physical and mental health issues for most of her
adult life. Based on this mitigating information, Ms. Ruiz submits that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence.
In addition to the mitigating circumstances above, Ms. Ruiz plays a key role in
her family. She has three young children with her current husband. 6 (PSI, p.18.) During
the presentence investigation, Ms. Ruiz reported that her children “suffer from a variety
of mental health issues.” (PSI, p.18; see also PSI, p.38.) In a letter to the district court,
Ms. Ruiz’s husband stated that one of their children was suicidal and another child had
serious mental issues after he was sexually assaulted. (PSI, pp.141–42.) He described
their three children as “disabled.” (PSI, p.141.) He also wrote that Ms. Ruiz is a very
good mother. (PSI, p.141.) He stated that the children need Ms. Ruiz to work through
their mental health issues. (PSI, pp.141–42.) Additionally, one of Ms. Ruiz’s adult
children from her first marriage wrote a letter explaining that the family will experience
“extreme hardship” without Ms. Ruiz. (PSI, p.139.) For example, Ms. Ruiz made the
appointments and took her children to see various doctors, counselors, and PSR
workers. (PSI, p.18.) Ms. Ruiz submits that the support she provides to her family is a
mitigating circumstance.

Ms. Ruiz also has two adult children from her first marriage. (PSI, p.16.) In addition,
Ms. Ruiz has a sixteen-year-old son, who tested positive for marijuana at birth. (PSI,
p.18.) He was placed in foster care and later adopted by Ms. Ruiz’s brother. (PSI,
p.18.)

6
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Also in support of mitigation, Ms. Ruiz has accepted responsibility for her crime,
expressed remorse, and demonstrated a commitment to rehabilitation. Acceptance of
responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler,
103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Here, Ms. Ruiz read a letter to the district court at
sentencing:
I apologize to the community and the court for my actions and for the time
taken to hear this case. I know what I did was wrong, and I’m very
ashamed. I realize that these are -- there are multiple victims in this
matter. The store, the store owners, the employees, the taxpayers, my
family, and especially my children. I am extremely ashamed and
remorseful with the fact that I let an addiction come between me and my
family and my freedom.
(Sentencing Hr’g Tr., p.18, L.19–p.20, L.2; see also PSI, p.136 (first page of Ms. Ruiz’s
letter to the court).) In addition, she wrote a letter to one of the forgery victims
apologizing for her behavior and promising to pay restitution. (PSI, p.138.) Similarly, she
stated during the presentence investigation, “I am very remorseful not because I got
caught but because all of the victims is suffered [sic] and are currently suffering
because of my actions.” (PSI, p.9.)
While still accepting responsibility for her crime, Ms. Ruiz was confident that her
criminal behavior would not have occurred but for her drug use. (Sentencing Hr’g
Tr., p.19, Ls.3–7.) She also told the district court and the presentence investigator that
she wanted treatment for her mental health issues and drug addiction. (Sentencing Hr’g
Tr., p.20, Ls.6–13; PSI, p.24.) Further, she acknowledged that she had “no right” to ask
the district court to consider her children as sentencing since she did not consider their
best interests while she was using drugs. (PSI, p.25.) But, now that she was sober,
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Ms. Ruiz stated that all she wanted was to obtain treatment and be a better parent.
(PSI, p.25.)
Finally, Ms. Ruiz’s commitment to recovery is evidenced by her behavior in jail. In
jail, Ms. Ruiz requested drug and alcohol treatment. (PSI, p.143.) She attended nine
early recovery groups, twelve MRT-Thinking for Good groups, and completed eight out
of ten workbook modules. (PSI, p.143.) She also attended eleven Relapse Prevention
groups. (PSI, p.143.) The Treatment and Recovery Clinic reported that Ms. Ruiz was
engaged in the treatment “as evidenced by her attendance and insightful questions.”
(PSI, p.143.) Ms. Ruiz’s acceptance of responsibility, regret, and willingness to obtain
treatment support a lesser sentence.
In summary, Ms. Ruiz submits that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating circumstances, even when
weighed against any aggravating circumstances.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The district court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction and place the defendant
on probation or relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4). “A court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has
sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate.” State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241, 248 (Ct. App.
2013).
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In this case, Ms. Ruiz was placed in the Therapeutic Community on
November 26, 2015, but she did not arrive at the facility until December 23, 2014.
(R, p.114; PSI, p.125.) About one month into her rider, on January 27, 2015, the
Department of Correction recommended the district court relinquish jurisdiction and
included an APSI.7 (PSI, p.125.) Without holding a hearing on the matter or allowing
Ms. Ruiz to respond,8 the district court relinquished jurisdiction. (R., p.119.) The district
court concluded that Ms. Ruiz’s behavior showed that she was unwilling to participate in
the programming. (R., p.119.)
Ms. Ruiz submits that the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was an
abuse of discretion because the district court did not give her adequate time to benefit
from the rider programming. As discussed above, Ms. Ruiz struggles with drug
addiction, mental health problems, and physical ailments. Ms. Ruiz has abused various
substances and engaged in other destructive behavior to cope with the hardships in her
life. For example, Ms. Ruiz used drugs to “numb memories of the trauma and feelings
she did not want to relive.” (PSI, p.37.) Similarly, she relapsed with methamphetamine
to deal with her mental breakdown after her lung cancer diagnosis. (PSI, p.15.) Ms. Ruiz
now recognizes that she must completely change her behavior and attitude to
rehabilitate and become a productive member of society. (PSI, pp.24–25.) To change
these lifelong coping mechanisms, however, Ms. Ruiz simply needed more time on the
rider. Ms. Ruiz contends that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction.

These documents were not filed with the district court until March 6, 2015. (PSI,
p.125.)

7
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Ruiz respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing or a rider review hearing.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Ms. Ruiz wrote a letter to the district court, but the district court received this letter after
it issued the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.145–46.)
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